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The secret wealth of commerce, and the precarious profits of
art or labour, are susceptible only of a discretionary valuation,
which is seldom disadvantageous to the interest of the
treasury; and as the person of the trader supplies the want of a
visible and permanent security, the payment of the imposition,
which, in the case of a land-tax, may be obtained by the seizure
of property, can rarely be extorted by any other means than
those of corporal punishments.'
INTRODUCTION
The Internal Revenue Code2 (hereinafter I.R.C.) requires
employers to withhold various taxes from the pay of their
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1. 1 EDWARD GIBBON, HISTORY OF THE DECLINE AND FALL OF THE ROMAN
EMPIRE 493 (U. B. Bury, ed., Heritage Press 1946) (1788), also available at
http://www.earthops.org/gibbons/2dfrel0.html (last visited June 16, 2003).
2. Unless noted otherwise, all section references in this Article are to the
Internal Revenue Code (I.R.C.) of 1986, as amended. The Tax Reform Act of
1986, Pub. L. 99-514, 100 Stat. 2095 (1986), redesignated the Internal Revenue
Code of 1954 as the Internal Revenue Code of 1986 and provided that except
where inappropriate official reference to one shall entail reference to the other.
Though the Internal Revenue Code is codified at Title 26 of the United
States Code, this Article will employ the convention, as widely utilized and
accepted among tax practitioners and courts, of citing the Internal Revenue
Code as "I.R.C." instead of "26 U.S.C." See THE BLUEBOOK: A UNIFORM SYSTEM
OF CITATION, P.5, at 16, and R.12.8.1, at 85 (Columbia L. Rev. Assn., et al., eds.,
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employees and to pay over the same to the Government.3
Pending actual transfer of the collected taxes to the government,
the monies thus collected are considered to be held in "a special
fund in trust for the United States." 4 Those individuals having
the duty or power to collect and remit such taxes may be
personally liable for amounts not in fact properly collected or
remitted.5 The personal liability imposed upon the individual
taxpayer by I.R.C. § 6672 is "separate and distinct" from the
employer entity's liability.6
The funds are thus commonly known as "trust funds" 7 and
the individual officers or employees of the employer who are
responsible for collecting and remitting the taxes are commonly
referred to as "responsible persons"8 or "responsible
individuals" 9 by the courts, and the IRS and tax practitioners. 10
17th ed., 2000); ASSOCIATION OF LEGAL WRITING DIRECTORS & DARBY DICKERSON,
ALWD CITATION MANUAL: A PROFESSIONAL SYSTEM OF CITATION, pt. 3,
§ 14.2(b)(3), at 103 (Aspen Law & Business, N.Y., 2000); see also Andrea I. Castro,
Overview of the Tax Treatment of Nonprofit Hospitals and Their For-Profit
Subsidiaries: A Short-Sighted Viez Could Be Very Bad Medicine, 15 PACE L. REV.
501, 501 n. 1 (1995).
Similarly, regulations issued by the Treasury Department pursuant to
the Internal Revenue Code will be cited as "Treas. Reg." instead of "26 C.F.R."
3. I.R.C. §§ 3102, 3403 (2003).
4. I.R.C. § 7501(a) (2003).
5. I.R.C. § 6672(a) (2003). Though not commonly invoked, there are also
criminal penalties on the books for failing to remit withheld taxes. See I.R.C.
§§ 7202, 7215 (2003).
6. See Datlof v. United States, 370 F.2d 655, 656 (3d Cir. 1966).
7. Slodov v. United States, 436 U.S. 238, 243 (1978); see also Fran Corp. v.
United States, 164 F.3d 814, 817 (2d Cir. 1999) (stating "the taxes an employer
withholds from and pays on behalf of its employees are often called 'trust fund
taxes."').
8. Slodov, 436 U.S. at 246 n7.
9. United States v. Energy Res. Co., 495 U.S. 545, 547 (1990) (citing Slodov,
436 U.S. 238 (1978)).
10. Section 6672 does not use the term "responsible person" or "responsible
party"; indeed, the statutory section is totally devoid of any form of the word
"responsible." See I.R.C. § 6672 (2003); cf., e.g., 42 U.S.C. § 9604(a) (2003)
(referring to "potentially responsible parties" in connection with toxic waste
clean-up statutes).
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Many states have similar or substantially verbatim statutes,"
which are construed by the respective state courts according to
the Federal courts' constructions of Federal trust fund statutes. 12
The list of who may be a "responsible person" under I.R.C.
§ 6672 (and the state statutes) is broadly inclusive. 13 There may be
11. CONN. GEN. STAT. § 12-736 (2003); N.Y. TAX LAW § 6 8 5(g) (Consol. 2003);
OHIO REV. CODE § 5739.33 (Anderson 2002). Some local municipalities,
including New York City, have their own trust fund statutes. See N.Y.C.
Admin. Code §§ 11-1913, 11-1927, 11-2016 (1996). The state and local statutes
can apply to sales taxes as well as income taxes. See, e.g., Matter of Harshad
Shah, Nos. DTA 814588 & 814589, 1999 N.Y. Tax LEXIS 54, at *16-*18 (N.Y. Feb.
25, 1999), also available at http://www.nysdta.org/Decisions/814588.dec.htm
(last visited June 29, 2003).
Some state statutes, such as Minnesota Statute § 270.101, are broader
than section 6672(a) because they do not require willfulness on the part of the
person in question in order to impose liability. See Minn. Stat. § 270.101 (2002);
Igel v. Corm'r, 566 N.W.2d 706, 709 (Minn. 1997) (stating that the state statute,
unlike the federal statute, does not require willfulness).
12. See, e.g., Breck v. State, 862 P.2d 854, 856-857 (Alaska 1993) (stating that
the federal construction of liability which considers the defendant's power over
the funds is persuasive); State v. Cook, No. CR93-441268S, 1993 Conn. Super.
LEXIS 2286, at *9-*11 (Conn. Super. Ct. 1993) (using federal court constructions
of similar federal statutes to determine liability); Brumby v. Brooks, 216 S.E.2d
288, 292 (Ga. 1975) (stating that "the Federal statute is sufficiently similar in
language and purpose to aid in construing the present Georgia statute");
Branson v. Dep't of Revenue, 659 N.E.2d 961, 965 (Ill. 1995) (noting that the
court had previously referred to federal courts' constructions of similar federal
statutes); Dep't of Revenue v. Safayan, 654 N.E.2d 270, 274-275 (Ind. 1995)
("Our analysis of Safayan's liability is not unique. A number of federal circuit
courts have held officers personally liable in similar circumstances under
equivalent provisions of the federal withholding tax."); Rosenblatt v. N.Y. State
Tax Comm'n, 498 N.Y.S.2d 529, 532 (N.Y. App. Div. 1986) (using federal
constructions of similar statutes to guide them in their decision), rev'd on other
grounds, 498 N.E.2d 148 (N.Y. 1986).
13. Section 6671(b), which sets forth definitions applicable to section 6672,
reads: "The term 'person,' as used in this subchapter, includes an officer or
employee of a corporation, or a member or employee of a partnership, who as
such officer, employee, or member is under a duty to perform the act in respect
of which the violation occurs." I.R.C. §§ 6671(b), 6672 (2003). The sweep of
section 6671(b), and ergo section 6672, is very broad, and the examples set forth
in section 6671(b) are illustrative rather than qualificatory. See United States v.
Graham, 309 F.2d 210, 212 (9th Cir. 1962). The statutes "must be construed to
include all those so connected with a corporation as to be responsible for the
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more than one "responsible person," and the existence of other
responsible persons does not absolve a responsible person of his
or her trust fund liability for the entire amount of taxes in
question.14 Though not directly specified in the statute, the total
trust fund liability is collected only once, whether from the
employer entity itself or one or more responsible persons; to the
extent that any one responsible person pays trust fund liability,
the liability of all others is accordingly discharged.15
The Internal Revenue Service ("IRS") may choose the
responsible person or persons from whom it will collect, and may
proceed against any or all such responsible persons in any order
of its choosing until the entire amount due is collected.16 The
availability of other responsible persons having collectable assets
performance of the act in respect of which the violation occurred." Id.; see also
Baily v. United States, 355 F. Supp. 325,330 (E.D. Pa. 1973).
This Article leaves to others the task of specifying and cataloging those
persons who have been or may be tarred by the broad statutory brush of
section 6672. See, e.g., Mary A. Bedikian, The Pernicious Reach of 26 U.S.C. § 6672,
13 VA. TAX REV. 225 (1993); Corrie Lynn Lyle, The Wrath of I.R.C. § 6672: The
Renewed Call for Change- Is Anyone Listening? If You Are a Corporate Official, You
Had Better Be, 74 S. CAL. L. REV. 1133, 1140 (2001).
14. See, e.g., Thosteson v. United States, 304 F.3d 1312, 1318, 1320 (11th Cir.
2002) (stating that although there were other responsible parties, who were
perhaps even more responsible, that did not absolve the plaintiff of liability),
affg 182 F. Supp. 2d 1189 (M.D. Ala. 2001).
15. See, e.g., United States v. Sotelo, 436 U.S. 268, 280 n.12 (1978) (citing
Comptroller General's Opinion B-137762 (May, 3 1977)); United States v.
Pomponio, 635 F.2d 293, 298 n.6 (4th Cir. 1980) (stating that, as a policy, the IRS
will only collect the amount owed once); IRS, Policy Statement, Trust Fund
Recovery Penalty Assessments (Feb. 2, 1993), 1993 TAX NOTES TODAY 27-17 (Feb. 5,
1993).
16. Pomponio, 635 F.2d at 298 (4th Cir. 1980) (explaining that the
Government is permitted to collect from any party in the order of its choosing);
Kelly v. Lethert, 362 F.2d 629, 635 (8th Cir. 1966) (stating the Government can
take action against responsible parties as well as the corporation itself "in the
order best suited in its judgment to collect the unpaid tax"); see also Abramson
v. United States, 39 B.R. 237, 239 (Bankr. E.D.N.Y. 1984) (stating that case law
has held that the Government can pursue any party in any order of its
choosing).
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does not impose upon the IRS any duty to pursue or refrain from
pursuing any particular responsible person.17
In 1996, as part of the Taxpayer Bill of Rights 2 (hereinafter
referred to as "TBOR2"), Congress enacted a statutory right of
contribution in favor of responsible persons who actually pay
more than their proportionate share of trust fund penalties
against other responsible persons. 18 This article will discuss the
right of contribution under I.R.C. § 6672.
I. HISTORY OF THE TRUST FUND STATUTE AND THE RIGHT OF
CONTRIBUTION
A. Statutory Background
The prospect of tax collectors misappropriating sovereign
property by commingling it with personal property was
apparently a royal concern in the days of King Hammurabi. 19
17. See, e.g., Hornsby v. United States, 588 F.2d 952, 954 (5th Cir. 1979)
(finding that it is within the Commissioner's discretion in pursuing some, but
not all of the entities that are liable).
18. Tax Payers Bill of Rights 2, Pub. L. No. 104-168, § 903, 110 Stat. 1452,
1466 (1996) (codified at I.R.C. § 6672(d)) [hereinafter TBOR2]. The new
subsection reads:
(d) Right of contribution where more than one person liable for penalty. If
more than one person is liable for the penalty under subsection (a) with
respect to any tax, each person who paid such penalty shall be entitled to
recover from other persons who are liable for such penalty an amount equal
to the excess of the amount paid by such person over such person's
proportionate share of the penalty. Any claim for such a recovery may be
made only in a proceeding which is separate from, and is not joined or
consolidated with -
(1) an action for collection of such penalty brought by the United States, or
(2) a proceeding in which the United States files a counterclaim or third-party
complaint for the collection of such penalty.
Id.
19. See, e.g., CODE OF HAMMURABI KING OF BABYLON §§ 38-39, at 25 (R. F.
Harper transl., Win. W. Gaunt & Sons, Inc., 1994) (circa 2250 B.C.):
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While the Temple stood in Jerusalem, such commingling of the
shekels collected from the populace and earmarked for sacerdotal
purposes was discouraged not only through fear of the Almighty
Himself, but also through surveillances done by mortal humans.20
Serious penalties for not remitting collected taxes to the
government were decreed in the days of the Roman Empire.2'
Following such a rich and ancient tradition of holding the tax
collectors and agents accountable for the tax funds they collect
and handle, the Revenue Act of 1918 articulated the current
American statutory scheme of imposing a personal monetary
penalty separate and apart from, but equal to, unremitted third-
party tax collections.22 The 1918 provision persisted, substantially
unchanged, in the prevailing Federal tax statutes through 1954.23
Meanwhile, the national thrust of waging World War II
placed obvious demands upon the public fisc, and certainly
affected the financial positions of millions of Americans.24
Taxpayers who had incurred reductions in their salaries
§ 38
An officer, constable or tax-gatherer shall not deed to his wife or daughter the
field, garden or house, which is his business (i.e., which is his by virtue of his
office), nor shall he assign them for debt.
§ 39
He may deed to his wife or daughter the field, garden or house which he has
purchased and (hence) possesses, or he may assign them for a debt.
Id.
20. MAIMONIDES, MISHNEH TORAH: HILCHOT SHEKALiM, ch. 2, 10 at 95
(Rabbi Eliyahu Touger trans., Moznaim Publ. Co. 1993) ("And they would talk
to him [continuously] from the time he entered until the time he departed, so
that he could not place [a coin] in his mouth.").
21. See, e.g., CODE JUST. 12.62.3 (Gratins & Valentinian) (c. 380), reprinted in
15 THE CIVIL LAW 319 (S. P. Scott, trans., Central Trust Co.) (photo. reprint, AMS
Press 1973) (1932) ("Whenever a collector is accused and convicted of
depredations, he must suffer the penalty prescribed by the law, without
appealing to Our clemency.").
22. Revenue Act of 1918, ch. 18, § 1308(c), 40 Stat. 1143.
23. Under the Internal Revenue Code of 1939, the successor provisions to
Revenue Act of 1918 section 1308(c) were codified in sections that related to the
applicable type of third-party collection taxes (e.g., narcotics formerly 26 U. S. C.
§ 2557(b)(4) (repealed 1954), firearms (formerly 26 U.S.C. § 2707(a) (repealed
1954)).
24. See SHELLEY L. DAVIS, UNBRIDLED POWER 196 (HarperBusiness 1997).
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(including those who went into military service at lower
remuneration than paid by their civilian jobs) often had difficulty
coming up with the funds some months after pay day to cover the
taxes that had been imposed upon their wages and salaries.25
New York Federal Reserve Board member Beardsley Ruml,
obviously drawing upon his expertise and experience as a retail
department store executive, devised a plan for national
withholding of income taxes from wages.26 Ruml's "pay as you
go" plan was enacted into law in 1943, and employers were thus
required to withhold income taxes from the paychecks of the
American workforce.27
The withholding plan thus ameliorated both the Treasury's
strained cash flow situation and the problem of the taxpayer's
inconvenience in paying the personal income tax.28 Another
advantage to the government, albeit one not commonly discussed
as a specific taxation policy rationale, is that in light of the
universal resentment held for taxation,29 the interposing of a
25. See id.
26. See id.; Donelan Phelps & Co. v. United States, 876 F.2d 1373, 1374-1375
(8th Cir. 1989) (explaining the origins of the current system of taxation, where
the funds are withheld from the employee's paycheck).
27. Current Tax Payment Act of 1943, ch. 120, Pub. L. No. 78-68, 57 Stat.
126.
28. Cf. ADAM SMITH, THE WEALTH OF NATIONS Book V, Ch. II, Pt. II at 778
(Edwin Cannan, ed., Modern Library 1937) (1789) ("[Maxim number] III. Every
tax ought to be levied at the time, or in the manner, in which it is most likely to
be convenient for the contributor to pay it") (emphasis added), also available at
http://www.ecn.bris.ac.uk/het/smith/wealbk05 (last visited Aug. 19, 2003).
29. See, e.g., People v. Coleman, 4 Cal. 46,48-49 (1854):
The exactions of Government, by way of tax or assessment, are always met
with reluctance; and the citizen, too often forgetting that they are the price of
his personal liberty, and the security of his property, is disposed to regard
them as arbitrary impositions, from which he may properly escape by any
defense or technicality.
Id.; cf. RALPH WALDO EMERSON, ESSAYS SECOND SERIES: POLiTICS (1844), reprinted
in RALPH WALDO EMERSON ESSAYS & LECTURES 567 (Joel Porte ed., The Library
of America 1983) ("Of all debts, men are least willing to pay the taxes").
When Lawrence Gibbs became the United States Commissioner of Internal
Revenue in 1986, he reportedly was asked by his son: "Well, Dad, how do you
feel being the most disliked person in America?" Tom Herman, Tax Report: A
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third-party collection agent places the government out of
immediate range of the opprobrium -rational or otherwise-of
the taxpayer, 0 thus leaving the shopkeeper to directly deal with
the ill will of the customer on account of the imposition of a sales
tax, 31 or likewise, having the employer absorb much of the flak
from the imposition of a tax on the labor of the working man or
woman.
32
By the time the smoke had cleared from World War II,
America's tax statutes and number of people in the work force
had, over the course of a half century, definitively shifted the
primary base of America's tax receipts from excise to income.33
Special Summary of Federal and State Tax Developments, WALL ST. J., Oct. 26, 1994,
at Al.
30. See, e.g., People v. Brown, 59 Cal. 345, 350-351 (1881) (affirming capital
murder conviction in which defendant and other ex-convicts had conspired "to
commit larceny, burglary, and robbery, and particularly, to rob the Tax
Collector of [Mendocino] county, and to resist by force any who might attempt
to interfere with them or to capture them."); Commonwealth v. Gearing, 83
Mass. 595 (1 Allen) (1861) (convicting defendant of assault upon deputy sheriff
attempting to collect taxes); Mendenhall v. United States, 6 Okla. Crim. 436
(Okla. Crim. App. 1911) (affirming the lower court ruling where defendant was
convicted of assault with intent to kill a city marshal in tax collection dispute);
United States v. Sciolino, 505 F.2d 586, 587 (2d Cir. 1974) (convicting a
defendant of threatening an IRS agent); United States v. Guthrie, 385 F.2d 410,
410-411 (7th Cir. 1967) (affirming a conviction for assaulting an IRS agent
performing official duties); United States v. Hart, 545 F. Supp. 470, 473 (D.
N.Dak. 1982) (providing declaratory and injunctive relief to plaintiffs where
defendant threatened a "posse comitatus" arrest of IRS agents; his actions were
deemed to be "substantial interference with the administration and enforcement
of the internal revenue laws"), appeal dismissed and sanctions imposed for frivolity,
701 F.2d 749 (8th Cir. 1983); cf. People v. Williams, 17 Cal. 142, 144 (1860)
(reviewing conviction of defendant tax collector who attempted to offer a
witness that would testify that tax collectors arm themselves for protection,
while collecting taxes).
31. See, e.g., Michael Cooper, Suspect Is Arrested in Threat to Store That Was
Set Ablaze, N.Y. TIMES, Apr. 28, 1998, at B3 (suspect in firebombing allegedly
threatening to burn down store in dispute with store owner over sales tax on
purchase of a hat).
32. See, e.g., Elizabeth Mehren, Massachusetts Man Convicted of Office
Massacre, L.A. TIMES, Apr. 25, 2002, Al (describing a workplace massacre that
was the result of a tax dispute between employer and employee defendant).
33. See DAVIS, supra note 24, at 196-197.
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The enactment of the Internal Revenue Code of 1954 retained
the basic statutory scheme in I.R.C. § 6672, albeit with more
specification regarding the type of tax to which the scheme
applied. 34 The enactment in 1996 of TBOR2 amended I.R.C.
§ 6672 by giving a statutory right of contribution to responsible
persons who pay the trust fund penalties,3 5 together with the
right to know the status of the IRS's collection efforts against
other responsible persons with respect to the same trust funds.36
34. Internal Revenue Act of 1954, c. 736, 68A stat. 828 (1984) (current
version at 26 U.S.C.A. § 6672 (2003)). Justice Brennan criticized the statute has
having been drawn "perhaps inartfully" to achieve its intended purpose.
Slodov v. United States, 436 U.S. 238, 250 (1978). Brennan was neither the first
nor the last American jurist to be vexed by the complexity of the tax laws. See,
e.g., Judge Learned Hand, Thomas Walter Swan, 57 YALE L.J. 167, 169 (1947):
[T]he words of such an act as the Income Tax, for example, merely dance
before my eyes in a meaningless procession: cross-reference to cross-reference,
exception upon exception -couched in abstract terms that offer no handle to
seize hold of-leave in my mind only a confused sense of some vitally
important, but successfully concealed purport, which it is my duty to extract,
but which is within my power, if at all, only after the most inordinate
expenditure of time.
Id.; see also Houston Textile Co. v. Comm'r, 173 F.2d 464 (5th Cir. 1949) ("This
petition brings up for solution one of those difficult jigsaw tax law puzzles all
too common in the present deplorable crazy quilt patchwork state of the
Internal Revenue."); Cohen v. United States, 995 F.2d 205, 209 (Fed. Cir. 1993)
("It is rare that tax law bears any recognizable relationship to common sense.").
35. See note 18 supra and accompanying text.
36. TBOR2, Pub. L. No. 104-168, § 902, 110 Stat. 1452, 1466 (1996) (codified
at I.R.C. § 6103(e)(9) (2003)). The new subsection reads:
(9) Disclosure of certain information where more than one person subject to
penalty under section 6672.- If the Secretary determines that a person is liable
for a penalty under section 6672(a) with respect to any failure, upon request in
writing of such person, the Secretary shall disclose in writing to such
person -
(A) the name of any other person whom the Secretary has determined to
be
liable for such penalty with respect to such failure, and
(B) whether the Secretary has attempted to collect such penalty from
such other
person, the general nature of such collection activities, and the amount
collected.
Id.
TBOR2 also made other amendments to section 6672, largely irrelevant
to the discussion in this Article, relating to preliminary notice requirements and
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B. Right of Contribution
Prior to TBOR2, responsible persons who paid the trust fund
penalties had no Federal statutory right of contribution from
other responsible persons.37 As for a Federal right of contribution
or indemnification based upon common law and not statute, in
1974 United States District Judge Raymond J. Pettine specifically
requested briefings from the parties on the issue in the
DiBenedetto case,38 and then after considering such briefings,
found that there was no such right under Federal law.39
DiBenedetto had been called "the seminal case" on the question of
the right of contribution for responsible parties under I.R.C.
§ 6672,40 and had been followed in many other decisions. 41 With
to immunity for voluntary board members of tax-exempt organizations. TBOR2
§ 901, 110 Stat. 1452, 1465-1466 (codified at I.R.C. § 6672(b)); TBOR2 § 904, 110
Stat. 1452, 1467 (codified at I.R.C. § 6672(e)).
37. See note 18 supra and accompanying text.
38. DiBenedetto v. United States, 1974 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 5908, 75-1 U.S.T.C.
(CCH) 9,503 (D.R.I. 1974) (stating that the lower court requested briefings on
whether a fourth party complaint can be viewed as providing a right of
contribution, and if so whether a person found liable has the right to implead
other "responsible persons").
39. See id. (finding that there is no right of contribution for a person found
liable even there are other potentially "responsible persons").
40. Rebelle v. United States, 588 F. Supp. 49, 51 (M.D. La. 1984); I.R.C.
§ 6672(d) (2003).
41. See, e.g., Swift v. Levesque, 614 F. Supp. 172, 173 (D. Conn. 1985) (stating
that while they find no federal right of contribution, the liable party is not
precluded from pursuing a judgment against other possibly liable parties under
state law); Alten v. Ellin & Tucker, Chartered, 854 F. Supp. 283, 288 (D. Del.
1994) (finding that a party is entitled to assert a right of contribution if it is
under state law, however such a right is not provided under federal law); Laub
v. Ross, 1992 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 21259, at *5 (S.D. Fla. 1993), magistrate's findings
adopted and ordered, 818 F. Supp. 340, 343 (S.D. Fla. 1993) (holding that although
the lawsuit was an action to indemnify a party found liable under 26 U.S.C.A.
§ 6672, there was no federal jurisdiction, such an action must be brought under
state law since there is no federal right to contribution); Continental Ill. Nat'l
Bank & Trust Co. v. United States, 1987 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 5933, at *3, 87-2
U.S.T.C. (CCH) 9,442 (E.D. Ill. 1987) ("The law is well established that in the
absence of specific statutory authority, there exists no federal common law
right of contribution."); Schoot v. United States, 664 F. Supp. 293, 297 (N.D. Ill.
1987) (finding that if someone is found liable for the unpaid taxes, they should
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few exceptions, there was no Federal common law right of
contribution prior to TBOR2.42
Various policy reasons were cited by courts for refusing to
find an implied Federal right of contribution.43 Courts have
recognized that the complication of a case by such claims would
not be foreclosed from pursuing a remedy against another liable party under
state law); Geiger v United States, 1978 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 18433, 78-1 U.S.T.C.
(CCH) 9,395 (D. Md. 1978) (dismissing the claims of a party who attempted to
seek contribution for tax penalties that he paid on the basis that there is no
federal right to contribution); Goranson v. United States, 1991 U.S. Dist. LEXIS
19069, at *13 (D. Mass. 1991) (stating that although there may be no right of
contribution under federal law, that does not preclude an action under state
law); Garity v. United States, 1980 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 16791, 81-2 U.S.T.C. (CCH)
9,598 (E.D. Mich. 1980) ("To the extent this case is based on an implied right
of indemnity summary judgment is required by the well established principle
that persons assessed penalties under section 6672 of the Internal Revenue
Code have no right to indemnification or contribution from others who may
also be liable."); Cohen v. United States, 35 AFTR 2d 75-1445 (E.D. Mich. 1975)
(agreeing with DiBenedetto that there is no right to contribution); Moats v.
United States, 564 F. Supp. 1330, 1341 (W.D. Mo. 1983) (finding the reasoning of
DiBeneditto to be applicable to the case at bar); Carlucci v. United States, 793 F.
Supp. 482, 484, 487 (S.D.N.Y. 1992) (dismissing the action for lack of subject
matter jurisdiction and stating that if there is a state cause of action, the suit
must be brought in a separate proceeding); Cook v. United States, 765 F. Supp.
217, 219-220 (M.D. Pa. 1991) (stating that there is no federal right to
contribution, and a federal court lacks jurisdiction to hear a state claim for
contribution concurrently with the Government's action); Hanhauser v. United
States, 85 F.R.D. 89, at *4 (M.D. Pa. 1979) (noting that case law consistently
holds that there is no federal right of contribution); Seachrist v. Riggs, 1990 U.S.
Dist. LEXIS 17844, at *17, 91-1 U.S.T.C. (CCH) 50,019 (N.D. W. Va. 1990)
(stating that "any action for indemnification or contribution.., must arise
under federal law" and further finding that no such right exists); Knapp v.
Applewhite, 124 B.R. 609 (Bankr. M.D. Fla. 1991) (holding that "as a matter of
law no such right to contribution exists"); In re All Star Sports, Inc., 78 B.R. 281,
283 (Bankr. D. Nev. 1987) (noting that there is strong precedence supporting the
finding that there is no federal right to contribution).
42. But see Reid v. United States, 558 F. Supp. 686, 689 (N.D. Miss. 1983)
(finding that "[i]t is proper that indemnity be used as an equitable device to
assure complete justice by shifting responsibility from the 'responsible person'
back to the employer upon whose shoulders rests the original obligation.").
43. See, e.g., Continental Ill. Nat'l Bank & Trust Co., 1987 U.S. Dist. LEXIS
5933, at *4 (stating that an implied federal right of contribution would open the
courts up to excessive collateral litigation).
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prolong the judicial process, and hence delay the collection of the
revenue.44 Moreover, the prospect of being personally saddled
with total liability for the company's tax bill has been viewed as a
strong incentive for all who may be responsible persons to
proactively ensure that the trust funds are in fact properly
remitted to the government.45 Focusing upon the need for
retribution upon the wrongdoer, it has been observed that the
penal effects of I.R.C. § 6672 would be diluted or defeated by
allowing the responsible person in question to shift the burdens
of his or her punishment.46 Additionally, the old equitable clean
hands doctrine has also been cited as a policy reason for denying
a right of contribution for trust fund penalties.47
Some states have recognized a right of contribution under
state law for I.R.C. § 6672 liability,48 while other states have
44. See, e.g., Swift, 614 F. Supp. at 177; Schoot, 664 F. Supp. at 298; Cook, 765
F. Supp. at 219; Moats, 564 F. Supp. at 1341-1342; Carlucci, 793 F. Supp. at 486.
45. See, e.g., Cook, 765 F. Supp. at 219-220; Rebelle, 588 F. Supp. at 51;
Continental Ill. Nat'l Bank & Trust Co., 1987 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 5933, at *4-*5 (citing
Rebelle, 588 F. Supp. at 51).
46. See, e.g., All Star Sports, 78 B.R. at 284.
47. Wynne v. Fischer, 809 S.W.2d 264, 267 (Tex. App. 1991). The Wynne
decision related to a right of contribution in a state court under state law. Id. at
268.
48. See, e.g., Lostocco v. D'Eramo, 518 S.E.2d 690, 695 (Ga. Ct. App. 1999)
(stating that Congress intended for their to be a right to contribution in state
courts); Goldhill v. Kramer, 176 S.E.2d 232,234 (Ga. Ct. App. 1970) ("Where one
has paid more than his share of the common burden which all are equally
bound to bear, contribution can be enforced by him in an action at law or
equity."); Aardema v. Fitch, 684 N.E.2d 884, 899 (Ill. App. Ct. 1997) (holding
that there is a right to contribution, because to find otherwise would result in
inequity); Kamins v. Spyres, 540 P.2d 1208, 1211 (Okla. Ct. App. 1975)
(affirming a lower courts jury instructions that stated there can be multiple
parties that are responsible, and in such instances, there is joint liability);
People's Nat'l Bank of Souderton v. Onorato, 63 Pa. D. & C.2d 485,491 (Ct. C.P.
Montg'y Co. 1972) (stating that "where there are joint obligors and one of the
obligors shall discharge the debt, then, that obligor shall have the right in
equity to proceed against the other obligors to enforce their proportionate share
of contribution."); Esstman v. Boyd, 605 S.W.2d 237, 241 (Tenn. Ct. App. 1979)
(finding that there is a right of contribution due to principles of equity and
justice); see also Swift, 614 F. Supp. at 176-178 (finding a right of contribution
under Connecticut law).
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refused to recognize such a right.49 Such a right can arise out of a
contractual agreement between the parties.5 0
Thus, if a responsible person prior to TBOR251 was to
successfully assert a right of contribution for I.R.C. § 6672
penalties, it almost always had to be under state law, if
available.52 "The variations in state law sometimes [made] it
difficult or impossible to press successful suits in state courts to
force a contribution from other responsible persons."53 The
claims almost always needed to be brought in a state forum,
inasmuch as the Federal courts declined to exercise pendant
jurisdiction of such state law claims, particularly in the context of
an action by the IRS to collect the I.R.C. § 6672 penalty.54
49. See, e.g., Plato v. State Bank of Alcester, 555 N.W.2d 365, 367 (S.Dak.
1996) (finding that it would be contrary to public policy to permit a liable party
to assert a right of contribution under state law); Wynne, 809 S.W.2d at 268.
50. Glude v. Sterenbuch, 1998 U.S. App. LEXIS 410, at *19-*20 (4th Cir.
1998) (holding that the right to contribution was created through a contract, not
by statute); United States v. Becker, 1989 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 3227, at *11-*12
(S.D.N.Y. 1989) (finding that where an agreement exists between the parties to
share liability, the court should give effect to said agreement); Tubb v. Bartlett,
862 S.W.2d 740, 751 (holding that where there is an indemnity agreement that
was created to include tax liabilities, there is a right of contribution) (Tex. Ct.
App. 1993); see also Laub v. Ross, 1992 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 21259 (S.D. Fla. 1993)
(dismissing, for want of Federal jurisdiction, an action to vacate arbitration
which under state law upheld one responsible party's contractual right of
contribution).
The Tubb case upheld the contractual right of indemnification in Texas,
notwithstanding that an equitable right of contribution is not available in that
state. Compare Tubb, 862 S.W.2d at 751 with Wynne, 809 S.W.2d at 267-268.
51. The right of contribution is prospectively effective to penalties assessed
after July 30, 1996, the date TBOR2 was enacted. TBOR, § 903(b) 110 Stat. 1466
(1996).
52. See generally cases cited supra note 41.
53. H.R. REP. No. 104-506, at 40 (1996), reprinted in 1990 U.S.C.C.A.N. 1143,
1163.
54. See, e.g., Carlucci v. United States, 793 F. Supp. 482, 485-486 (S.D.N.Y.
1992); Cook v. United States, 765 F. Supp. 217, 220 (M.D. Pa. 1991); Schoot v.
United States, 664 F. Supp. 293, 298 (N.D. IIi. 1987); Wright v. United States,
1992 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 775, 93-1 U.S.T.C. (CCH) 50,056, 70 A.F.T.R.2d (RIA)
6187 (E.D.N.Y. 1992) (dismissing a third party complaint for lack of subject
matter jurisdiction).
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There were several problems with the pre-TBOR2 version of
I.R.C. § 6672.55 The statute was characterized as "harsh" by
several judges, albeit necessarily so. s6 But if the harshness was
necessary as a matter of policy, much of the unfairness of I.R.C.
§ 6672 prior to TBOR2 was not.5 7 In light of the IRS's "pay as
much as you can when you can" tax collection policies and
practices, 58 together with the IRS's prerogative to pursue the
responsible person or persons of its choice 9 and to make
settlements with any responsible person on any terms of its
choosing, 6° it is not difficult to imagine diverse possibilities for
the unfair administration of the statute on the part of the IRS.
"The IRS apparently makes no effort to administrate the penalty
55. See, e.g., Howard v. United States, 711 F.2d 729, 737 (5th Cir. 1983)
(holding that the government can choose arbitrarily which "responsible party"
it wishes to collect from).
56. E.g., id. (holding that under section 6672 the government can pursue any
party they choose even if this results in the least blameworthy party being
found liable); Wright v. United States, 809 F.2d 425, 428 (7th Cir. 1987) (stating
that "the statute is harsh, but the danger against which it is directed... is an
acute one against which, perhaps, only harsh measures are availing."); Carter v.
United States, 717 F. Supp. 188, 191 (S.D.N.Y. 1989) (noting that courts have
stated that application of section 6672 can sometimes have harsh results);
Mussato v. United States, 1982 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 14336, at *8 (D. Colo. 1982)
(finding that "[p]laintiff is a responsible person under the harsh statute").
57. See, e.g., Mussato, 1982 Dist. LEXIS 14336, at *7-*8 (stating that the IRS
need not find the most responsible party).
58. Fowler v. United States, 820 F. Supp. 1390, 1397 (D. Wyo. 1993) (stating
that a party may end up paying more money because "the IRS accounts for the
penalty payments in what amounts to a 'pay as much as you can when you can'
basis").
59. See, e.g., Mussato, 1982 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 14336, at *7-*8 (stating that they
must determine if the party found liable was a "responsible party," who the
court believes is most blameworthy is not relevant to their ultimate ruling); see
also H.R. REP. No. 104-506, at 40 (1996), reprinted in 1990 U.S.C.C.A.N. 1143,
1163 ("The IRS may collect this penalty from a responsible person from whom
it can collect most easily, rather than from the person with the greatest
culpability for the failure.").
60. See, e.g., Wollman v. United States, 571 F. Supp. 824, 828 (S.D. Fla. 1983)
(holding that the government cannot be precluded from settling with one of the
responsible parties).
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against potentially liable officers and directors in an equitable or
fair manner."61
This broad discretion can indeed serve to work gross
injustices in situations where the one responsible party who
contributed most to the delinquency disappears,62 or squanders
all of his or her assets on such vices as drugs or alcohol,63 or is
otherwise not an available or convenient source for the IRS to
tap.64 The IRS can proactively give favored treatment to one
responsible person over others, even when the favored party
wielded greater and closer control over the failure to pay the
taxes than the parties not so favored.65
The IRS's general ability to control taxpayer abuse by its
employees is most questionable,66 and its discretion is not always
61. Fozwler, 820 F. Supp. at 1394.
62. See, e.g., Thosteson v. United States, 304 F.3d 1312, 1315 (11th Cir. 2002);
Grizaffi v. United States, 1987 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 6951 (N.D. IlI. 1987).
63. See, e.g., Unger v. United States, 1999 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 10932, 84
A.F.T.R.2d (RIA) 6817 (S.D.N.Y. 1999), on remand from United States v. Landau,
155 F.3d 93 (2d Cir. 1998), cert. denied, 526 U.S. 1130 (1999).
64. See, e.g., Thosteson, 304 F.3d at 1318.
65. See, e.g., Bowlen v. United States, 956 F.2d 723, 725 (7th Cir. 1992)
(noting that the IRS offered a "conditional dispensation" to another responsible
party, and not to the Bowlens).
66. See, e.g., Dixon v. Comm'r, 316 F.3d 1041, 1046, opinion editorially
corrected at 2003 U.S. App. LEXIS 4843 (9th Cir. 2003) (noting that the secret
settlement deals made by IRS trial attorneys with key plaintiffs in test case
affecting approximately 1,300 taxpayers "amounted to a fraud on both the
taxpayers and the Tax Court"); IRS Inspection Service and Taxpayer Advocate
Roles for Ensuring that Taxpayers are Treated Properly: Hearing Before the U.S.
Sen. Comm. on Fin., 1998 Leg., 105th Sess. (Feb. 5, 1998) (statement of Lynda D.
Willis, Director, Tax Policy and Administration Issues, General Government
Division), available at http://www.unclefed.com/GAOReports/ggd98-63t.pdf
(last visited Aug. 20, 2003); 137 CONG. REC. S11813 (Aug. 1, 1991) (statement of
Sen. Symms) ("As the pressure on the IRS grows year after year to collect every
last dollar due to the Treasury, the incidents of taxpayers abuse by the Service
grow as well."); 126 CONG. REC. 14415 (1980) (remarks of Sen. Baucus)
("Numerous horror stories have been reported in Montana and elsewhere...
Fear of the IRS is based.., on its well-earned reputation for inconsistency and
unpredictability"); Statement of the National Society of Accountants Presented
to the U.S. H.R. Comm. on Ways and Means Subcomm. on Oversight on the
2002 Tax Return Filing Season (statement of William Stevenson, NSA Federal
Taxation Chairman), 2002 TAx NOTES TODAY 69-42 (Apr. 9, 2002).
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exercised on a pure cost/benefit or tax potential basis.67 Giving
the tax collector discretion so broad as to determine the amount
of a tax owed by any one taxpayer has long been recognized as an
invitation for such abuse,68 yet such was and is precisely the
discretion effectively reposed in the IRS in its enforcement of
I.R.C. § 6672.69
Concerned about the unfairness inherent in I.R.C. § 6672,
Congress, as part of TBOR2, amended the statute to give
responsible persons the right of contribution,70 and also required
Despite assurance of IRS management to the contrary, we fear that this
[National Research Program] is ripe for abuse by over zealous IRS agents.
Indeed, at a recent hearing of this Subcommittee, the IRS National Taxpayer
Advocate in a question and answer session remarked that it may be necessary
to have a third party monitor these audits to protect taxpayers.
Id.; see generally DAVIS, supra note 24.
67. See generally DAVID BuRNHAM, A LAW UNTO ITSELF: POWER, POLITICS AND
THE IRS (Random House, 1989); DAVIS, supra note 24.
The courts have a tendency to be especially stringent with the tax affairs of
former (and, for that matter, current) IRS employees, and "[tihe standard to
which the courts hold former IRS agents obviously impacts the standard to
which IRS tax examination personnel will hold their former colleagues in
personal tax examination situations." Kenneth H. Ryesky, Of Taxes and Duties:
Taxing the System with Public Employees' Tax Obligations, 31 AKRON L. REV. 349,
361 n.50 (1998). The fact that one of the responsible persons in question is a
former employee of the IRS may well be a factor in the IRS's determination of
whom to pursue. Id.
68. See SMITH, supra note 28:
[Maxim] II. The tax which each individual is bound to pay ought to be certain,
and not arbitrary. The time of payment, the manner of payment, the quantity
to be paid, ought all to be clear and plain to the contributor, and to every
other person. Where it is otherwise, every person subject to the tax is put
more or less in the power of the tax-gatherer, who can either aggravate the tax
upon any obnoxious contributor, or extort, by the terror of such aggravation,
some present or perquisite to himself. The uncertainty of taxation encourages
the insolence and favours the corruption of an order of men who are naturally
unpopular, even where they are neither insolent nor corrupt. The certainty of
what each individual ought to pay is, in taxation, a matter of so great
importance, that a very considerable degree of inequality, it appears, I believe,
from the experience of all nations, is not near so great an evil as a very small
degree of uncertainty.
Id.
69. Id.
70. TBOR2, Pub. L. No. 104-168, § 903, 110 Stat. 1452, 1466 (codified at I.R.C.
§ 6672(d) (2003)).
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the IRS to disclose its collection activities against other
responsible persons for the same trust funds.71 There now is a
Federal statutory right of contribution where none had
previously existed. Actual payment of the tax to the IRS is a
prerequisite to asserting the claim for contribution.72
II. SOME POTENTIAL ISSUES AND PROBLEMS IN ASSERTING THE
FEDERAL RIGHT OF CONTRIBUTION FOR TRUST FUNDS
As with other new statutory provisions, putting the statutory
theory of I.R.C. § 6672(d) into practice will likely have its
ambiguous moments until a body of case law develops to give
guidance as to the statute's application.73 Several areas not
explicitly spelled out in the statute, which may require judicial
clarification, are now discussed:
A. Courts in Which an I.R.C. § 6672(d) Contribution Claim Will Be
Heard
All Federal courts are courts of limited jurisdiction and
require specific jurisdictional authorization to exercise their
authority.74 The jurisdiction of the Federal courts in taxation
71. TBOR2, Pub. L. No. 104-168, § 902, 110 Stat. 1452, 1466 (codified at I.R.C.
§ 6103(e)(9) (2003)).
72. I.R.C. § 6672(d) (2003); Jones v. Noblit, 2001 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 9699, at *2
(D. Kan. 2001) (stating that an action for contribution under Section 6672(d)
requires the plaintiff to pay the taxes prior to bringing suit).
73. See ROScOE POUND, THE FORMATIVE ERA OF AMERICAN LAW 59 (Little
Brown & Co. 1938) ("Observers have often remarked a tendency, in common
phrase, to pass the buck to the courts,. . . to fill out a skeleton statute.").
74. U.S. Const., art. III, § 2; Owen Equip. & Erection Co. v. Kroger, 437 U.S.
365, 374 (1978) (noting that "federal courts are courts of limited jurisdiction");
Marbury v. Madison, 5 U.S. 137, 173-174 (1803) (explaining the Supreme Courts
jurisdiction to hear cases); American Fair Credit Ass'n v. United Credit Nat'l
Bank, 132 F. Supp. 2d 1304, 1308-09 (D. Colo. 2001) (stating that federal courts
have limited jurisdiction, and the burden of establishing subject matter
jurisdiction is on the party asserting it).
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matters is certainly limited.75 A Federal court's jurisdiction is
never presumed, but must be affirmatively demonstrated.76
With TBOR2's addition of Subsection (d) to I.R.C. § 6672
there now is specific jurisdiction conferred upon Federal courts to
entertain a right of contribution action for trust funds, provided
that the action "is separate from, and is not joined or consolidated
with" any proceeding in which the IRS seeks to collect trust fund
penalties from any responsible party with respect to the
underlying trust funds.77 This proviso obviates the public policy
concerns over complications from a trust fund penalty
contribution claim which might potentially hinder and delay the
revenue collection processes.78
Assuming that there is no IRS collection action involved in
the proceeding (which, for all practical purposes, would mean
that the IRS is not a party to the proceeding), it is quite obvious
that the Federal District Courts would have original jurisdiction
in an I.R.C. § 6672(d) action for contribution because it would be a
75. I.R.C. § 7421 (2003); see also Bob Jones Univ. v. Simon, 416 U.S. 725, 736-
37 (1974) (holding that pursuant to the Anti-Injunction Act, a court is not
permitted to enjoin the assessment or collection of taxes, any suit must be heard
subsequent to the government's action to assess or collect taxes).
76. See, e.g., Stock West, Inc. v. Confederated Tribes, 873 F.2d 1221, 1225 (9th
Cir. 1989) ("A federal court is presumed to lack jurisdiction in a particular case
unless the contrary affirmatively appears.").
In pleading a case before a Federal court, an indispensable preliminary
matter to be addressed by the pleading party is the court's jurisdiction. FED. R.
CIV. P. 8(a)(1); see also Tingley v. I.R.S., 1995 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 2363, at *4 (W.D.
Wash. 1995) (holding that federal courts are courts of limited jurisdiction, and
the party asserting such jurisdiction must affirmatively prove it).
77. I.R.C. § 6672(d) (2003); see also Winters v. United States, 1997 U.S. Dist.
LEXIS 12487 (dismissing cross-claim for contribution in case where IRS sought
to collect trust fund penalty). Though the Winters decision cited section 6672(d)
in its rationale, the penalties at issue were assessed prior to the effective date of
section 6672(d) and accordingly, a claim for contribution would not be available
under section 6672(d) (though there might be a state claim for contribution). See
TBOR2 § 903(b), 110 Stat. 1466.
78. See note 44 supra and accompanying text. But see MacDonald v. United
States, 2003 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 14418 (S.D. Mich. 2003) (finding that cross claim
against third party for contribution based upon breach of contract is separate
from and does not implicate I.R.C. § 6672(d), but dismissing the cross claim on
other jurisdictional grounds).
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civil action "arising under" a Federal statute.79 Such actions have
already been brought in at least one Federal District Court.80
Whether a Federal Bankruptcy court would have jurisdiction
over an I.R.C. § 6672(d) action is more problematic.1 The
Bankruptcy court, of course, would not have jurisdiction over a
§ 6672(d) action if an IRS claim to collect the trust fund penalty
were involved; and because the IRS, as a creditor, would most
highly likely be involved if the tax were not paid in full, it is very
difficult to imagine a § 6672(d) claim being assertable in a
Bankruptcy proceeding where the tax remains unpaid in full or in
part.8 2 Moreover, Bankruptcy courts do not have the authority to
determine the tax liabilities of parties other than the debtor at
bar.83
If the IRS has been paid in full and has thereby been taken
out of the picture, then there might be occasion for a Bankruptcy
court to somehow deal with the matter, though sufficient case law
on this point has yet to develop.8 4 If, for example, the debtor in
Bankruptcy, having paid the trust fund penalty in full prior to
insolvency, were asserting a § 6672(d) claim for contribution
against another responsible person, then such would certainly be
the property of the Bankruptcy estate.85 However, if the only
79. 28 U.S.C. § 1331 (2003).
80. Spade v. Star Bank, 2002 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 21643 (E.D. Pa. 2002)
(adjudicating a section 6672(d) action where plaintiff asserted a right of
contribution for a tax assessment); Spade v. Star Bank, 2002 U.S. Dist. LEXIS
24228 (E.D. Pa. 2002). In the Spade cases, though the Court for the Eastern
District of Pennsylvania adjudicated the respective section 6672(d) claims of
Jerome Spade (and ergo had subject matter jurisdiction over them), Mr. Spade
was unsuccessful on the merits of his claims. Id.; see also Walker v. United
States, 43 Fed. Cl. 519, 520 (1999) (suspending action pending adjudication of
section 6672(d) suit in Federal District Court).
81. See In re Macagnone 240 B.R. 444, 445 (M.D. Fla. 1999).
82. See generally Kankel v. C.I.R., 2000 WL 1819417 (M.D. Fla. 2000).
83. Quattrone Accountants, Inc. v I.R.S., 895 F.2d 921, 925-26 (3d Cir. 1990)
(stating that their authority to determine tax liability only extends to the debtor
before the court).
84. See, e.g., In re Ozark Restaurant Co. v. Andersen, 816 F.2d 1222 (8th Cir.
1987).
85. Id. at 1225 (8th Cir. 1987) (noting that causes of action of the debtor are
part of the estate), cert denied, 484 U.S. 848 (1987); see also In re Chenoweth v.
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connection to the bankruptcy were the prospects of increasing the
value of the Bankruptcy estate, then the claim would not be a core
proceeding in Bankruptcy,8 6 and therefore not a matter for a
Bankruptcy judge without consent of the parties.87
If, on the other hand, the § 6672 trust fund penalty were
already paid by another responsible person and a § 6672(d) claim
were then in turn being asserted against the debtor, then such
may well be within the jurisdiction of the Bankruptcy court as a
claim by a creditor of the Bankruptcy estate.88 From a policy
standpoint there should be no objection per se to such
adjudication by a Bankruptcy court; after all, the allowance or
disallowance of claim against a bankruptcy estate is a "core"
matter over which Bankruptcy courts generally do have
jurisdiction,89 and the actual payment to the IRS, albeit by a party
other than the debtor in bankruptcy, should moot all objections
based upon the detinue of the Treasury's revenue on account of
litigation.90
Once the § 6672 penalty is paid to the IRS, a refund action
may be brought in the Court of Federal Claims.91 The jurisdiction
of the Court of Federal Claims is limited to suits against the
United States,92 and any actions before that court are disregarded
Chenoweth, 143 B.R. 527, 534 (S.D. Ill. 1992) ("Causes of action are among the
property interests that become property of a debtor's bankruptcy estate.").
86. See In re R.I. Lithograph Corp. v. Aetna Casualty & Surety Co., 60 B.R.
199, 203-204 (Bankr. D.R.I. 1986) (holding that although RILC's action for
indemnification would increase the value of their estate, that in itself does not
make it a core proceeding).
87. 28 U.S.C. § 157(c) (2003).
88. See 28 U.S.C. § 157(b)(2)(B) (2003). See infra notes 169-178 and
accompanying text for a discussion of issues relating to the dischargeability of
the obligation in bankruptcy.
89. 28 U.S.C. § 157(b)(2)(B) (2003); see also In re S. G. Phillips Constructors,
Inc. v. Burlington, 45 F.3d 702, 703 (2d Cir. 1995) (reversing a district court's
order and stating that "the determination of claims is a 'core' bankruptcy
function").
90. See supra note 44 and accompanying text.
91. I.R.C. § 6672 (2003).
92. See 28 U.S.C.S. § 1491(a)(1) (2003); see also Cottrell v. United States, 42
Fed. C1. 144,148 (Fed. Cl. 1998) (stating that the Court of Federal Claims only
has jurisdiction over suits against the United States).
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to the extent that relief is sought against other parties.93
Accordingly, the Court of Federal Claims is not an appropriate
forum for a § 6672(d) action, and indeed, that court has
suspended proceedings against the United States for tax refunds
where the plaintiff has simultaneously brought a § 6672(d)
contribution claim against other responsible persons in another
tribunal.94 The Court of Federal Claims clearly is not and should
not be a forum for a § 6672(d) action.95
The United States Tax Court, in which the Respondent party
is always the Commissioner of Internal Revenue who seeks to
collect a tax and the Petitioner party is always the taxpayer
seeking to avoid paying that tax assessment, would certainly not
be the appropriate forum for an I.R.C. § 6672(d) contribution
action.96
"If an act of Congress gives a penalty to a party aggrieved,
without specifying a remedy for its enforcement, there is no
reason why it should not be enforced, if not provided otherwise
by some act of Congress, by a proper action in a State court."97
Accordingly, Federal § 6672(d) claims might also be brought in
state courts.98 State courts have had jurisdiction to entertain
claims arising under other Federal statutes, including the civil
rights statutes99 and the Telephone Consumer Protection Act,100
93. National Cored Forgings Co. v. United States, 126 Ct. Cl. 250, 256 (Ct.
Cl. 1953) (refusing to adjudicate simultaneous claims against other parties and
focusing on the claims against the United States).
94. See Walker v. United States, 43 Fed. Cl. 519, 521 (Fed. Cl. 1999).
95. See supra notes 92-94 and accompanying text.
96. The United States Tax Court normally does not have the jurisdiction to
hear disputes regarding section 6672 trust fund issues even as between
taxpayer and IRS. Wilt v. Comm'r, 60 T.C. 977, 978 (1973) (dismissing the case
for lack of subject matter jurisdiction).
97. Claflin v. Houseman, 93 U.S. 130, 137 (1876).
98. Id.
99. See, e.g., Williams v. Horvath, 548 P.2d 1125, 1127 (Cal. 1976) (noting
California state court jurisdiction over Federal 42 U.S.C. § 1983 claim); Lloyd v.
Page, 474 So. 2d 865, 867-868 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1985) (stating that state courts
have concurrent jurisdiction over cases arising under federal statutes); Madison
v. Cinema I, 454 N.Y.S.2d 226, 227 (N.Y. Civ. Ct. 1982) (finding New York City
Civil Court had jurisdiction over a Federal 42 U.S.C. § 1981 claim).
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though states such as Texas seem to require a specific enabling
statute from the state legislature in order for the state courts to
have jurisdiction to hear complaints arising under a particular
Federal statute.101 Therefore, the use of a state court forum for a
Federal § 6672(d) contribution action would depend upon
whether such a claim is allowed under the laws of the particular
state,102 and while such claims ideally should be allowed, the
explicit jurisdiction of the Federal courts over a § 6672(d) matter
goes a long way towards eliminating the unfairness in those
states whose courts will not countenance such claims. 103
B. Statute of Limitations
Congress did not set forth a specific limitations time for
bringing an action under I.R.C. § 6672(d) when it enacted the
statute in 1996.104 Accordingly, the four year Federal catch-all
limitations period in 28 U.S.C. § 1658 for commencing civil
100. See Schulman v. Chase Manhattan Bank, 710 N.Y.S.2d 368, 369 (N.Y.
App. Div. 2000) (finding jurisdiction in New York state courts to entertain
claims arising under the Telephone Consumer Protection Act of 1991, 47 U.S.C.
§ 227 (2003)); see also Szefczek v. Hillsborough Beacon, 668 A.2d 1099 (N.J.
Super. Ct. Law Div.. 1995) (hearing and adjudicating a 47 U.S.C. § 227 claim in
state court).
The Telephone Consumer Protection Act is an unusual Federal statute
in that a private right of action under it may only be brought in a state court. See
Foxhall Realty Law Offices, Inc. v. Telecomm. Premium Servs., Ltd., 156 F.3d
432, 434 (2d Cir. 1998) (finding that state courts have exclusive jurisdiction over
claims based on the Telephone Consumer Protection Act of 1991); Erienet, Inc.
v. Velocity Net, Inc., 156 F.3d 513, 516 (3rd Cir. 1998) (following other circuit
courts rulings that state court has exclusive jurisdiction over claims brought
under the Telephone Consumer Protection Act of 1991).
101. See Autoflex Leasing, Inc. v. Manufacturers Auto Leasing, Inc., 16
S.W.3d 815, 817-818 (Tex. Ct. App. 2000) (stating that a Federal claims arising
under the Telephone Consumer Protection Act was not authorized in Texas
courts prior to the effective date of the Texas enabling statute).
102. Cf. generally supra notes 48-53 and accompanying text.
103. Cf. Telephone Consumer Protection Act of 1991, 47 U.S.C. § 227 (2003).
Unlike claims arising under section 6672(d), TCPA actions may be brought in
state courts. Id.; see also supra note 100 and accompanying text.
104. I.R.C. § 6672(d) (2003).
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actions applies to I.R.C. § 6672(d) actions. 105 Notwithstanding the
use of the word "penalty" in I.R.C. § 6672(a), trust fund exaction
(or attempted exaction) from responsible persons by the I.R.S.
does not amount to a "penalty" within the meaning of 28 U.S.C.
§ 2462, and accordingly, the five-year period of limitation in that
statute would be inapplicable to the dilatory § 6672(d) plaintiff.106
The statute of limitations being four years "after the cause of
action accrues,"107 the event constituting the accrual of the cause
of action must then be identified. On that score, I.R.C. § 6672(d)
seems reasonably explicit on its face, entitling the responsible
person bringing the § 6672(d) action to "an amount equal to the
excess of the amount paid by such person [emphasis supplied]."108
Actual payment of moneys to the IRS (or, perhaps, to another
responsible person in the same or another § 6672(d) action) would
constitute an accrual of the action. 09
Suppose, however, that the total trust fund liability had yet to
be paid in full even after the responsible person bringing the
I.R.C. § 6672(d) action made a payment to the IRS, or indeed, that
the IRS was continuing its collection efforts against the § 6672(d)
plaintiff in question. Case law has yet to develop on the question
of whether the statute of limitations is tolled pending full
satisfaction of the underlying tax debt, or whether a new
§ 6672(d) claim must be brought with respect to amounts paid
after initiating the original § 6672(d) action. But the potential for
105. 28 U.S.C. § 1658(a) (2003). The statute, by its own terms, applies to "a
civil action arising under an Act of Congress" which was enacted after § 1658
became effective, which was December 1, 1990. Id. I.R.C. § 6672(d), enacted July
30, 1996, falls within the coverage of 28 U.S.C. § 1658 welK beyond civil. Id.; see
also I.R.C. § 6672(d) (2003).
106. See United States v. Marine Midland Bank, 544 F. Supp. 268, 271
(W.D.N.Y. 1982) (ruling that lender liability pursuant to I.R.C. § 3505, a statute
with a scheme similar to I.R.C. § 6672, is not a "penalty" for the purposes of 28
U.S.C. § 2462 and therefore, the 5 year limitation in § 2462 does not apply to
I.R.C. § 3505 actions). 28 U.S.C. § 2462 (2003) applies to the Internal Revenue
Code by dint of I.R.C. § 6533, which reads, in relevant part, "[flor period of
limitation in respect of civil actions for fines, penalties, and forfeitures, see
section 2462 of Title 28 of the United States Code."
107. 28 U.S.C. § 1658(a) (2003).
108. I.R.C. § 6672(d) (2003).
109. 28 U.S.C. § 1658(a) (2003); I.R.C. § 6672(d) (2003).
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judiciary inefficiency in what might be multiple causes of action
is a lesser evil than the unfairness that I.R.C. § 6672(d) was
designed to counteract, and is lessened all the more by the
significant (though hardly perfect) likelihood that if other
responsible persons are viable sources of payment then the IRS
would pursue them as well. In view of the compelling purpose in
enacting the statute, namely, protection from the unfairness
inherent in the IRS's broad discretionary powers to those who
actually pay the trust fund taxes, the requirement of actual
payment should be adhered to.11O
C. Determining the "Proportionate Share of the Penalty"
I.R.C. § 6672(d) authorizes a right of contribution for "an
amount equal to the excess of the amount paid by such person
over such person's proportionate share of the penalty.""' In
order to do the arithmetic to determine the amount to be sued for
in a § 6672(d) action it is necessary to construe the meaning of
"proportionate share."112
A most administratively simple construction of the term
"proportionate share"" 3 would be equal aliquot shares among
responsible persons-e.g., giving one-half of the total if there
were two responsible persons, or one-fifth of the total if there
were five responsible persons. Such construction is most certainly
not the construction intended by Congress, which identified a
significant unfairness in the pattern of IRS not always going after
"the person with the greatest culpability for the failure" to pay
over the trust funds. 114  Had Congress intended the
"proportionate share" to be an equal allocation among
responsible persons, there certainly was more definitive and
explicit language available for it to do so.115
110. See H.R. REP. No. 104-506, at 40 (1996), reprinted in 1990 U.S.C.C.A.N.
1143, 1163.
111. I.R.C. § 6672(d) (2003).
112. Id.
113. Id.
114. H.R. REP. No. 104-506.
115. Cf. McDermott, Inc. v. AmClyde & River Don Castings, Ltd., 511 U.S.
202, 210 n.9 (1994) ("In this opinion, we use the phrase 'proportionate share
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Moreover, though I.R.C. § 6672 operates upon any
responsible person without regard to degree of fault or blame,116
many courts have spoken in terms of the relative degrees of
responsibility of responsible persons." 7 The concept of relative
responsibility was set forth in a very graphic nautical metaphor
by U.S. District Judge Whitman Knapp in one of his Unger
litigation rulings:
[T]hese seemingly impartial uncalled witnesses might have
established that Unger considered himself "a cabin boy on a
sinking ship" whose sole duty was to follow the admiral's
orders as the latter was trying to maneuver the vessel to
safety; and that he faithfully followed those orders even after
being warned (by the company's outside accountants) that if
the ship ultimately sank he might follow it to the bottom of the
approach.' We have deliberately avoided use of the term 'pro rata' . . . because
that term is also used to describe an equal allocation among all defendants
without regard to their relative responsibility for the loss.") (citations omitted);
In re Del-Val Fin. Corp. Sec. Litig., 868 F. Supp. 547, 561 (S.D.N.Y. 1994) (using
term "proportionate share" as a function of fault, not equal aliquot
apportionment); Kentucky Fried Chicken of Morgantown, Inc. v. Sellaro, 214
S.E.2d 823, 826-827 (W. Va. 1975) (construing term "proportionate share" as a
function of real property area, and not equal apportionment).
116. See Howard v. United States, 711 F.2d 729, 737 (5th Cir. 1983) (stating
that "section 6672(a) looks only to 'responsible persons,' not to 'the most
responsible person,' for satisfaction").
117. See, e.g., id.; Gephart v. United States, 818 F.2d 469, 476 (6th Cir. 1987)
(stating that although other corporate officials "were more responsible than
plaintiff, and exercised greater authority, this does not affect a finding of
liability against plaintiff"); Keohan v. United States, 138 F. Supp. 2d 62, 75 (D.
Mass. 2001) (commenting that although there may be people that are more
responsible, that does not negate any other party's liability); Sutton v. United
States, 194 F. Supp. 2d 559, 565 (E.D. Tex. 2001) (holding that I.R.C. section 6672
applies to any responsible party and does not consider the degree of liability);
Mussato v. United States, 1982 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 14336, at *8 (D. Colo. 1982) ("If
my duty were to assess the tax against the chief culprit, I would quickly assess
the tax against Mr. Seaborn, and I would excuse Mr. Mussato. But, that's not
what I am required to decide nor am I permitted to rule on the basis of
comparative fault.").
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sea while the admiral was picked up by helicopter and safely
put ashore.118
Accordingly it is clear that "proportionate share" does not
necessarily mean equally distributing the burden." 9 Determining
the "proportionate share" of the responsible person, then, must
necessarily entail an analysis of the relative culpability of all
responsible persons.120 Fortunately, this need not be a major
judicial or administrative nightmare, because the same case law
factors used to objectively determine whether a person is a
responsible person under I.R.C. § 6672 can also be applied to help
fix the degree of responsibility. 121 A roster of these factors, derived
from prior decisions, has conveniently been enumerated in the
Fiataruolo opinion as follows:
[whether and to what extent the person in question]
(1) is an officer or member of the board of directors,
(2) owns shares or possesses an entrepreneurial stake in the
company,
(3) is active in the management of day-to-day affairs of the
company,
(4) has the ability to hire and fire employees,
118. Unger v. United States, 1997 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 190, at *2 (S.D.N.Y. 1997).
The Unger litigation would wind its way through the courts for many years,
and included a remand after denial of certiorari by the United States Supreme
Court on one issue. See also Unger v. United States, 1999 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 10932,
84 A.F.T.R.2d (RIA) 6817 (S.D.N.Y. 1999), on remand from United States v.
Landau, 155 F.3d 93 (2d Cir. 1998), cert. denied, 526 U.S. 1130 (1999).
119. See, e.g., Howard, 711 F.2d at 737.
120. Fiataruolo v. United States, 8 F.3d 930, 939 (2d Cir. 1993).
121. Id.
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(5) makes decisions regarding which, when and in what order
outstanding debts or taxes will be paid,
(6) exercises control over daily bank accounts and
disbursement records, and
(7) has check-signing authority. 122
To which the New York State Supreme Court, Appellate
Division, Third Department 23 would hasten to add an eighth
factor, whether and to what extent the person in question did or
could have actually signed the tax returns.124 Moreover, a similar
set of factors is set forth in the Internal Revenue Manual.125
122. Id. (tabular arrangement supplied).
123. For reasons apparently relating more to tradition and nostalgia than to
logic, New York State's lowest trial courts of general jurisdiction are known as
the "Supreme Courts" in that state, while the intermediate appellate courts are
called the "Appellate Divisions" of the Supreme Court and the highest court in
the New York State Court System is known as the "Court of Appeals." See
FRANCIS BERGAN, THE HISTORY OF THE NEW YORK COuRT OF APPEALS, 1847-1932 at
25 (Columbia Univ. Press 1985); see also DAVID D. SIEGEL, NEW YORK PRACTICE
§§ 10-12 (3d ed. 1999).
By statute, the Appellate Division Third Department hears appeals from
decisions of the New York State Tax Appeals Tribunal, N.Y. TAX L. § 2016
(2003).
124. Hall v. Tax Appeals Tribunal, 574 N.Y.S.2d 862, 863 (N.Y. App. Div.
1991) (considering whether the individual was able to sign tax as a factor in
assessing liability); Rosenblatt v. N.Y. State Tax Comm'n, 498 N.Y.S.2d 529, 533
(N.Y. App. Div. 1986) (Mikoll, J., dissenting) (stating that Rosenblatt was
responsible for taxes because he was responsible for filing and preparing the
tax returns), rev'd in part and dissent upheld, 498 N.E.2d 148 (1986); Hopper v.
Comm'r of Taxation, 637 N.Y.S.2d 494, 495 (N.Y. App. Div. 1996) (finding that
petitioner was a responsible person who could be held liable because he signed
tax returns on behalf of the company), appeal denied, 88 N.Y.2d 808, 670 N.E.2d
1345 (1996); Amengual v. State Tax Comm'n, 464 N.Y.S.2d 272, 273 (N.Y. App.
Div. 1983) (stating that an important factor in determining liability is whether
the individual signs the company's tax returns); see also 20 N.Y. COMP. CODES R.
& REGS., tit. 20 § 526.11(b)(2) (1976).
The Ohio courts also use actual signature on the tax returns as a factor
in determining personal responsibility for state trust fund taxes. See, e.g., Burns
v. Tracy, 1995 Ohio App. LEXIS 309, at *7 (Ohio Ct. App. 1995) (stating
217
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Accordingly, sound established guidance does exist for
objectively comparing responsible persons and fixing relative
degrees of responsibility, ergo, "proportionate share," for the
purposes of an I.R.C. § 6672(d) action.126 The tribunal that
determines such proportions certainly should, and quite likely
will, make use of the factors articulated in case law.127
Another potential issue in determining the "proportionate
share" is the degree to which a determination by one
administrative agency or tribunal is valid precedent for others.128
The IRS's determinations or collection actions or inactions
certainly cannot be viewed as indicators of relative responsibility
in light of the patently demonstrated lack of objectivity of that
agency.129 Indeed, the IRS makes no pretensions to determine
relative trust fund responsibility among responsible persons, and
such was the very basis for enacting I.R.C. § 6672(d) in the first
place.130 But there is no reason why a proceeding in which the
decider specifically determines respective degrees of
responsibility, and in which all responsible parties have had
opportunity to present the merits of their respective cases, should
not be valid precedent.' 3' Such a situation can arise, for example,
"personal derivative liability may be imposed upon an officer who is connected
with the making and filing of the returns even though there may exist a higher
authority within the corporation which may have exclusively controlled or
directed which debts should be paid."); Olszko v. Tracy, 1995 Ohio App. LEXIS
3509, at *9 (Ohio Ct. App. 1995) (affirming the Board of Tax Appeals
determination in finding appellant was a responsible party based on his ability
to sign checks and tax returns). Similarly, actual signature on the tax returns is
a factor weighed by the Illinois Department of Revenue. See, e.g., Illinois Dep't
of Revenue v. John Doe, No. ST 02-22, at 7 (Aug. 19, 2002), available at
http://www.revenue.state.il.us/legalinformation/hearings/st/st02-22.pdf
(last visited Aug. 26, 2003).
125. See I.R.M. § 5.7.3.3.1 (July 31, 1998), available at
http://www.irs.gov/irm/page/0,,id3D21886,00.html#ss6 (last visited Aug.
27, 2003).
126. Id.
127. Id.
128. See generally United States v. Landau, 155 F.3d 93 (2d. Cir. 1998), cert.
denied, 526 U.S. 1130 (1999).
129. See generally supra notes 59-68 and accompanying text.
130. See generally supra notes 59-68 and accompanying text.
131. See generally Landau, 155 F.3d 93.
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where the cognizant state taxation authority imposes personal
trust fund liability with respect to state trust fund taxes either
before or after the IRS imposes such liability with respect to
Federal taxes.132
D. Appropriate Parties to an I.R.C. § 6672(d) Action
Though I.R.C. § 6672(d) specifically tells us who is not to be a
party in an action for contribution -the IRS itself133 - the statute is
silent as to whom, other than the party seeking contribution, must
necessarily be involved in the action.134 But if all who are
potentially responsible are actual parties to the action instead of
being mere witnesses, "the adversary process should assure that
each potential responsible person will present his or her
132. Compare, e.g., id. (reciting fact that IRS assessed trust fund penalties in
1987 against Nathan Unger and Robert Landau with respect to Federal
withholding taxes owed by Robert Landau Associates ("RLA") for 1984 tax
year) with Matter of Unger, N.Y.S. Tax App. Tribunal, D.T.A. Nos. 805351 and
805353 (Mar. 24, 1994) (reciting fact that New York State Department of
Taxation & Finance issued Notices of Determination to Nathan Unger and
Robert Landau on December 20, 1984 with respect to sales taxes for periods
ending August 31, 1984 owed by RLA), available at
http://www.nysdta.org/Decisions/805351.dec.rtf (last visited Nov. 17, 2003).
Though the aforementioned proceedings involving RLA's respective taxes did
not entail any right of contribution issues (and indeed, for Federal purposes the
trust fund penalties were assessed well prior to the effective date of section
6672(d)), the Federal and state proceedings clearly illustrate how a contribution
action may arise after the relative responsibility of the responsible persons has
been adjudicated in a prior proceeding involving the same individuals but
different trust fund taxes.
133. The proper party would be the United States, inasmuch as the IRS itself
cannot be sued eo nomine. See Evseroff v. I.R.S., 2000 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 15888, at
*6 (E.D.N.Y. 2000) (stating that the pleadings should be amended from the
Internal Revenue Service to reflect the correct party, the United States), affid,
2001 U.S. App. LEXIS 13139 (2d Cir. 2001); see also Castleberry v. Alcohol,
Tobacco & Firearms Div. of the Treasury Dep't 530 F.2d 672, 673 n.3 (5th Cir.
1976) (noting that the Treasury Department cannot be sued). Indeed, the
phraseology of section 6672(d) speaks in terms of an action in which "the
United States" is attempting to collect the trust fund penalty, and does not
mention the Internal Revenue Service by name. (2003).
134. See I.R.C. § 6672(d) (2003).
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respective view of operations within the company in the most
comprehensive and convincing manner."135 It thus would seem
that, barring unusual circumstances, all potentially responsible
persons should ideally be necessary parties to a § 6672(d) action if
their relative degree of responsibility has not otherwise been
determined or admitted.136
As a practical matter, most people who would qualify as
responsible persons under I.R.C. § 6672 would know the
identities of all other responsible persons from whom
contribution might be claimed137 Even if some responsible
persons are overlooked, those named in a § 6672(d) action would
have every incentive to implead those not sued by the first-party
plaintiff."38 And the IRS must, upon request of a person it has
determined to be liable for a § 6672 penalty, identify all others it
has determined to be responsible persons and disclose
information regarding its collection activities against such
persons.139 Persons so identified by the IRS should normally be
135. Walker v. United States, 43 Fed. Cl. 519, 522 (Fed. Cl. 1999).
136. FED. R. Civ. P. 19, I.R.C. § 6672(d) (2003).
137. But see H. Rosenblum, Inc. v. Adler, 461 A.2d 138 (1983) (defendant is
captioned as "Jack F. Adler... [and 426 other named Defendants listed in the
Complaint], individually and as partners trading as Touche Ross & Co.,
severally and in the alternative, Defendants-Respondents"). Rosenblum was an
accounting malpractice lawsuit brought before the days of limited partnerships
and other limited liability entities, where all 427 partners faced potential
malpractice liability, though it is not clear whether every one personally knew
every other one. Defendant Jack F. Adler's misfortune to lead the list of
partners appears to have been more a consequence of his place in the
accounting firm's alphabetical order than in its pecking order. Though not a
I.R.C. § 6672(d) trust fund liability matter (and indeed, decided over a decade
before TBOR2), the Rosenblum case thus suggests how dysfunctions in
identifying responsible parties in a large geographically-dispersed employer
might arise, particularly an employer lacking the organizational discipline and
fiscal controls supposedly found in accounting firms).
138. See FED. R. CIV. P. 19, I.R.C. § 6672(d) (2003).
139. See I.R.C. § 6103(e)(9) (2003).
The scope of the IRS's disclosure would appear to include any agreements with
entities controlled by the other responsible persons for the payment of the taxes
in question. See United States v. N.Y. State Div. of the Lottery, 1996 U.S. Dist.
LEXIS 16840, at *3-*4 (S.D.N.Y. 1996) (finding that a liable party is entitled to
disclosure regarding money that the Internal Revenue Service receives towards
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parties to a § 6672(d) lawsuit.140 If, perchance, despite all of the
foregoing safeguards, a § 6672(d) action somehow goes forward
to judgment without the inclusion of all responsible persons, then
such an unlikely situation could potentially be remedied by an
additional § 6672(d) action against such omitted parties by those
who have been found liable in the first § 6672(d) action and have
paid their judgments accordingly (though impleader in the initial
action would obviously be a far, far preferable alternative). 141
Issues regarding the identity and involvement of necessary
parties to a § 6672(d) action thus seem, overall, to be little cause
for concern. 42  There nonetheless are conceivable situations
where the issue might surface.43 These include the large
employer with many units in diverse cities, several of whose
geographically-dispersed personnel might technically qualify as
responsible parties, 144 or where a responsible party has a
the tax assessed because it would effectively reduce the party's financial
responsibility). The New York State Division of the Lottery decision illustrates an
anomaly of TBOR2. While the IRC § 6672(d) right of contribution is effective
with respect to taxes assessed after the July 30, 1996 effective date of the Act,
TBOR2 § 903(b), 110 Stat. 1466, the IRC § 6103(e)(9) right to disclosure became
effective upon the July 30, 1996 enactment of the Act, TBOR2 § 902(b), 110 Stat.
1466. Accordingly, though DiBella, the responsible person in New York State
Division of the Lottery, was unable to benefit from the Federal statutory right of
contribution (but apparently could assert a state common law right), he was
able to benefit from the information disclosure requirements even though the
§ 6672 penalties had been assessed before TBOR2. Id.
140. See I.R.C. § 6672(d) (2003).
141. Cf., e.g., SIEGEL, supra note 123, § 173 at 283.
142. FED. R. CIV. P. 19, I.R.C. § 6672(d) (2003).
143. See H. Rosenblum, Inc., 461 A.2d 138 (1983).
144. Cf., e.g., id. This accounting malpractice lawsuit was brought before the
days of limited partnerships and other limited liability entities, and all 427
partners faced potential malpractice liability, though it is not clear whether
every one personally knew every other one. Id. Defendant Jack F. Adler's
misfortune to lead the list of partners appears to have been more a consequence
of his place in the accounting firm's alphabetical order than in its pecking order.
Id. Though not an I.R.C. § 6672(d) trust fund liability matter (and indeed,
decided over a decade before TBOR2), the Rosenblum case thus suggests how
dysfunctions in identifying responsible parties in a large geographically-
dispersed employer might arise, particularly an employer lacking the
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successor in interest.145 Even if and when such situations should
arise, the courts and parties are given broad leeway to bring
about the joinder of parties and/or to proceed in the absence of
parties, 146 and indeed, persons against whom there might be
asserted a right of contribution in general are not indispensable
parties to a lawsuit.147 So while it is generally quite preferable to
include all responsible persons as parties to an I.R.C. § 6672(d)
action, such actions can certainly go forward in cases where that
ideal is unfulfilled. 148
E. Interplay with the Estate Tax
Death is a taxable event, 49 and though there are serious
prospects for the Federal Estate Tax to be repealed,150 the law is
still effective.51 Moreover, repeal of the Federal Estate Tax would
not necessarily ordain the repeal of the analogous state estate tax
statutes, which, in many cases, are patterned after the Federal
organizational discipline and fiscal controls supposedly found in accounting
firms. Id.
145. See United States v. N.Y. State Div. of the Lottery, 1996 U.S. Dist. LEXIS
16840, at *6 (S.D.N.Y. 1996).
146. See FED. R. Civ. P. 19, see also N.Y. C.P.L.R. § 1001 (Consol. 2003).
147. See Nottingham v. General American Communications Corp., 811 F.2d
873, 880-881 (5th Cir. 1987) (stating that parties who may be liable for
contribution or indemnification are not necessary parties), cert. denied, 484 U.S.
854 (1987).
148. See supra notes 133-147 and accompanying text.
149. I.R.C. §§ 2056A(b)(1)(B), (9) (1999).
150. Economic Growth and Tax Relief Reconciliation Act of 2001, Pub. L.
107-16, §§ 501-531, 115 Stat. 148 [hereinafter EGTRRA]. EGTRRA contains
provisions for its own sunset which would repeal the repeal of the Federal
Estate Tax after December 31, 2010, thus effectively reinstating the Federal
Estate Tax beginning in the year 2011. EGTRRA § 901, 115 Stat. 150. There are
legislative efforts currently underway to make the gradual repeal of the
Federal Estate Tax permanent, and indeed, to accelerate it. See, e.g., S. 3, 107th
Cong. (2002); Press Release, Kyl to Reintroduce Contract With Investors (Jan. 6,
2003), 2003 TAX NOTES TODAY 5-29 (Jan. 8, 2003).
151. I.R.C. § 2001 (2003).
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scheme. 5 2  Accordingly, a § 6672(d) cause of action may be
relevant with respect to taxation of a decedent's estate. 5 3
Claims against the estate are deductible from the gross estate
in computing the taxable estate.15 4 Such claims can include
liabilities imposed by law or arising out of torts. 55 "The claim
must be a personal and enforceable obligation of the decedent" at
the time of death.156 If the claim asserted against the estate is a
judgment of a court, the judgment must be on the merits of the
case. 5 7 Where the court rendering the judgment is not the
highest court in the state, the IRS may apply the law of the state
as the highest court has or would apply it, and in doing so,
override the judgment.58 The judgment in a collusive lawsuit not
adjudicated on the merits is not necessarily accepted as a
deductible claim against the estate. 5 9
Where there is a viable right of contribution from other
parties with respect to a claim against the estate,,such claim must
be reduced accordingly, 160 or, in the alternative, the right of
contribution is an estate asset, the inclusion of which would bring
152. See, e.g., Joshua S. Rubenstein, Federal "Repeal" of Estate Tax Puts Burden
on States, N.Y.L.J., Sept. 9, 2002, at 9.
153. I.R.C. § 6672(d) (2003).
154. I.R.C. § 2053(a)(3) (2003).
155. Treas. Reg. § 20.2053-4 (1958).
156. Kasishke v. United States, 426 F.2d 429 (10th Cir. 1970).
157. Treas. Reg. § 20.2053-1(b)(2) (1972).
158. Comm'r v. Estate of Bosch, 387 U.S. 456, 465 (1967) ("While the decrees
of 'lower state courts' should be 'attributed some weight.., the decision [is] not
controlling.' where the highest court of the State has not spoken on the point").
159. Id. at 463-465; Rev. Rul. 83-54, 1983-1 C.B. 229.
160. Johnson v. United States, 742 F.2d 137, 141 (4th Cir. 1984) ("By the terms
of the regulation, therefore, the amount covered by these rights of contribution,
whether exercised or not, must be excluded for any deduction claimed by the
estate."), rev'g 1983 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 18189 (W.D. Va. 1983); Kasishke v. United
States, 1969 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 10959, at *14 (N.D. Okla. 1969) (noting that rights
of contribution are assets of an estate thus increasing the value of the estate),
affd, 426 F.2d 429 (10th Cir. 1970); Estate of Theis v. Comm'r, 81 T.C. 741, 745
(1983) (noting that only enforceable claims can be deducted from the value of
an estate), affid, 770 F.2d 981 (11th Cir. 1985).
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about the same result.161 This is true even where that right of
contribution is subsequently relinquished.162
In an Estate Tax situation, then, there would be valuation
issues where a decedent either had an I.R.C. § 6672(d) right of
contribution against others, or owed contribution to others.63
This would likely entail a review the facts by the IRS or other
taxation authority in order to fix relative degrees of responsibility.
The highly specialized estate tax function within the IRS and the
various state taxation authorities 164 have long dealt with the task
of valuing the assets of and the claims against estates, and can be
expected to handle an asset or claim relating to I.R.C. § 6672(d)
with no less expedience or competence than with any other estate
asset or claim.165
F. Interplay with the Bankruptcy Law1 66
"[A]ny case that intertwines the provisions of the Bankruptcy
Code with those of the Uniform Commercial Code can become
confusing and complex."167 "Intertwin[ing] the provisions of the
Bankruptcy Code with the Internal Revenue Code" is surely no
161. Kasishke, 1969 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 10959, at *14-*15.
162. Johnson, 742 F.2d at 141.
163. I.R.C. §§ 2001, 6672(d) (2003).
164. See Sack v. Bentsen, 1995 U.S. App. LEXIS 5714, at *10 n.12 (1st Cir.
1995) (upholding, inter alia, IRS recruitment practices calculated to employ
persons having "up-to-date knowledge of legal principles and agency
practices" in Estate Tax Attorney positions.); Collins v. Comm'r, T.C. Memo
1973-192 (noting that between 1967 and 1971, the IRS had upgraded its
employment qualifications to require a law degree for new hires in the Estate
and Gift Tax examination section); see also Bass v. Bragalini, 143 N.Y.S.2d 490,
493 (Sup. Ct. Albany Co. 1955) (finding that associate attorneys for the
Department of Taxation and Finance are considered independent officers and
further outlining their responsibilities and the large degree of discretion
afforded to them in their positions), affd, 143 N.Y.S.2d 494 (N.Y. App. Div.
1955), leave to appeal denied, 309 N.Y. 1032 (1955).
165. I.R.C. § 6672(d) (2003).
166. The amenability of Bankruptcy court to a case brought under I.R.C.
§ 6672(d) is discussed supra at notes 83-88 and accompanying text.
167. In re Flo-Lizer, Inc., 946 F.2d 1237, 1242 (6th Cir. 1991) (Guy, J.,
dissenting).
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less complex. Accordingly, this article will not dwell upon "the
complex, detailed, and comprehensive provisions of the lengthy
Bankruptcy Code."168
It will suffice, therefore, to mention that a § 6672(a) trust fund
penalty itself is nondischargable in bankruptcy.169 And because
the taxes given priority under § 507 of the Bankruptcy Code
include "a tax required to be collected or withheld and for which
the debtor is liable in whatever capacity [emphasis supplied]," 170
which, in turn, is exempted from discharge under § 523 of the
Bankruptcy Code,17' it would seem that an obligation incurred by
a debtor in bankruptcy as a result of a § 6672(d) action would
similarly be nondischargeable. 172 Indeed, debts to third parties
for taxes paid to the taxing authority by the third party have been
held to be nondischargeable in bankruptcy.173
Moreover, for the purposes of § 547 of the Bankruptcy
Code,174 pre-petition trust funds paid by debtor employers to the
IRS or other taxation authorities do not constitute voidable
preferences, 17 even where the funds had been commingled with
168. MSR Exploration, Ltd., v. Meridian Oil, Inc., 74 F.3d 910, 914 (9th Cir.
1996).
169. 11 U.S.C. §§ 507(a)(8)(C), 523(a)(1)(A) (2003); In re Mosbrucker, 227 B.R.
434 (B.A.P. 8th Cir. 1998) (stating that tax liability under section 6672 is not
dischargeable in bankruptcy proceedings); Smith v. United States 894 F.2d 1549,
n. 6 at 1554 (11th Cir. 1990) (citing United States v. Sotelo, 436 U.S. 268, 277, a
case decided under the prior Bankruptcy Code).
170. 11 U.S.C. § 507(a)(8)(C) (2003).
171. 11 U.S.C. § 523(a)(1)(A).
172. A lawyer with expertise in bankruptcy and a bent for scholarly research
and writing would surely find positive reception from the bench and bar for a
more detailed article on this point of law.
173. See, e.g., In re Waite, 698 F.2d 1177, 1178 (11th Cir. 1983) (stating that
under the Bankruptcy Code, debts for taxes are not dischargeable); In re Norris,
107 B.R. 592, 595 (Bankr. E.D. Tenn. 1989) (stating that the majority rule is that a
creditor who fulfills a nondischargable tax obligation for the debtor has a
nondischargeable claim against the debtor).
174. 11 U.S.C. § 547 (2003).
175. Begier v I.R.S., 496 U.S. 53, 61 (1990) (holding that money held in trust
for the Internal Revenue Service is not considered part of the bankruptcy estate,
they are considered funds in trust for the Government); In re R & T Roofing
Structures & Commercial Framing, Inc., 887 F2d 981, 985, 988 (9th Cir. 1989)
(noting that funds held in trust for the government are not considered voidable
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the debtors assets.176 Whether and to what extent funds which
had been paid by a debtor in bankruptcy to another responsible
person pursuant to an I.R.C. § 6672(d) judgment (or in settlement
of the case) are similarly out of reach of the bankruptcy trustee
under Bankruptcy Code § 547 awaits case law interpretation.177 If
such transfers are in fact found to be voidable § 547 preferences,
then the purpose of I.R.C. § 6672(d) would be defeated, unless
and to the extent that the transfer was a collusive one.178
III. AVOIDING OR MINIMIZING LIABILITY IN TRUST FUND RESPONSIBLE
PERSON CONTRIBUTION LIABILITY ACTIONS
Trust funds held by employers are very tantalizing sources of
relief for cash flow problems.179  Once an employer has
succumbed to their allure, and thus gotten into the predicament
of having failed to properly remit trust fund taxes to the
government, the responsible persons must then shift their focuses
from damage prevention to damage control,180 and show, if
possible, that there were others to blame for the failure, and that
preferences; however, the court held that the government failed to establish
that the funds in question were held in trust); In re Razorback Ready-Mix
Concrete Co. (Bankr. E.D. Ark. 1984) 45 B.R. 917, 918-922 (Bankr. E.D. Ark.
1984) (finding that funds withheld from wages and paid to the government are
protected funds and cannot be recovered by the debtor).
176. Id. at 919.
177. I.R.C. § 6672 (2003), 11 U.S.C. § 547 (2003).
178. Cf., e.g., In re Pulcini, 261 B.R. 836, 843 (Bankr. W.D. Pa. 1991) (finding
transfer of real property not voidable where the transfer in question was
apparently noncollusive, and implying that the transfer would be voidable if
there had been collusion involved).
179. See, e.g., Slodov v. United States, 436 U.S. 238, 243 (1978) (noting "the
funds can be a tempting source of ready cash to a failing corporation
beleaguered by creditors"); Buffalow v. United States, 109 F.3d 570,572 (9th Cir.
1997) (noting how companies facing financial difficulties often use money held
in trust for the government); see also IRS's Efforts to Improve Compliance With
Employment Tax Requirements Should Be Evaluated: Report to the U.S. Sen. Comm.
on Small Bus. & Entrepreneurship, 2002 Leg., 107th Sess. (Jan. 15, 2002).
180. See, e.g., Jean v. United States, 2002 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 20183, at *14 (D.
Mass. 2002) (finding that potentially responsible person's responsibility ceased,
if not before, upon his voluntary relinquishment of signatory authority on
company checking account).
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the others were more responsible1S1 This can easily become a
distasteful finger-pointing affair, reminiscent of the famous
Thomas Nast "Tweed Ring" political cartoon depiction.182 And
once the IRS is on the case, obstructing or hindering its agents in
their quest for factual information and documents will, if
anything, enhance the chances of being a target for IRS collection
actions.183
Inappropriate attitudes and perceptions regarding the roles
and obligations of responsible persons can lead to running afoul
of the trust fund rules.84 Employer policies born of the attitude
that the company is merely a debtor of the taxation authorities,
rather than a trustee of money collected for the public fisc, are
prescriptions for trouble. 85 Employees in responsible positions
who passively acquiesce in superiors' directives not to pay the
trust fund taxes to the taxing authorities leave themselves open to
collection actions by the IRS.186 It certainly cannot be said by or
181. This can be done through asserting the right of contribution from other
responsible parties. See I.R.C. § 6672(d) (2003).
182. See Thomas Nast, Who Stole the People's Money? (cartoon), HARPER'S
WKLY, Aug. 19, 1871, available at
http://www.boondocksnet.com/gallery/nast710819.html (last visited Aug. 19,
2003).
183. I.R.S. Policy Statement, Trust Fund Recovery Penalty Assessments (Feb.
2, 1993), 1993 TAx NOTES TODAY 27-17 (Feb. 5, 1993).
184. See Rosenblatt v. N.Y. State Tax Comm'n, 498 N.Y.S.2d 529, 530-531
(N.Y. App. Div. 1986), rev'd on other grounds, 68 N.Y.2d 775 (1986); Sutton v.
United States, 194 F. Supp. 2d 559, 564 (E.D. Tex. 2001) (rejecting corporation
president's argument that paying the IRS without specific approval from the
major shareholder "would be akin to stealing from the company"); cf. Dep't of
Correction v. Headen, N.Y.C. Office of Admin. Trials & Hrgs. OATH Index No.
986/99 (May 20, 1999) (recommending disciplinary action against respondent
who claimed 99 exemptions from his income tax withholding, and testified that
he considered the withholding to be in a nature of a personal loan to be repaid
when filing his annual tax return), available at http://search.citylaw.org (last
visited Sept. 9, 2003).
185. See generally supra note 183.
186. See, e.g., Crutcher v. United States, 2002 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 3994, at *24
(N.D. Ala. 2002) (holding that plaintiff, an individual who did have check
signing authority was a responsible party despite the existence of a superior
officer who directed the dispersion of funds); see also Matter of O'Reilly, N.Y.
State Div. of Tax Appeals, Dkt. No. DTA 818564 (Jan. 9, 2003) (imposing state
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about a responsible person that the nonpayment of the trust fund
taxes to the taxation authorities is none of his or her concern.187
Responsible persons are required to take a certain degree of
proactivity in asserting the governmental claim to the tax monies
it is entitled to by statute, even, on occasion, at the risk of their
jobs.188
The best way to avoid liability for contribution under I.R.C.
§ 6672(d) is, of course, to ensure that all trust funds are properly
withheld and timely paid over to the tax collector, so that I.R.C.
§ 6672 and its analogous state statutes never become relevant in
the first place.189 "If the statute is followed, the amount retained
as taxes never leaves the employer's possession" until it is turned
over to the government.190 This ideally includes defining the
duties of a particular person within the organization to remit the
payments of the tax, with another person having meaningful
cognizance and authority to ensure that the tax has been so
remitted.191  In that regard, another section of the Internal
Revenue Code, together with its corresponding Treasury
Regulations, can be put to good use, because a filing or payment
that complies with the timely mailing rule of I.R.C. § 7502
produces a specified paper or electronic document as evidence.192
trust fund liability against petitioner, a law firm partner despite petitioner's
assertions that he had insufficient control over the finances of the firm), available
at http://www.nysdta.org/Determinations/818564.det.htm (last visited Nov.
17, 2003).
187. Gephart v. United States, 818 F.2d 469, 475 (6th Cir. 1987).
188. Id. at 474; Howard v. United States, 711 F.2d 729, 734-735 (5th Cir. 1983)
(stating that the court, "cannot condone his abdication of the responsibility
imposed upon him by law").
189. I.R.C. § 6672 (2003).
190. United States v. Porth, 426 F.2d 519,522 (10th Cir. 1970).
191. Cf. Rosenblatt v. N.Y. State Tax Comm'n, 498 N.Y.S.2d 529, 533 (N.Y.
App. Div. 1986) (Mikoll, J., dissenting), rev'd in part and dissent upheld, 68 N.Y.2d
775 (1986) (finding, on appeal, that trust liability of corporation comptroller
whose duties included filing tax returns but who "did not have control over the
payroll department where tax withholding took place").
192. See I.R.C. § 7502 (2003); Treas. Reg. § 301.7502-1 (2003); Treas. Reg.
§ 301.7502-2 (2003).
Several commentators have discussed at length the unsettled
controversy as to whether documentation or evidence other than that specified
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Production of the document thus created, or a reliable copy
thereof, can provide good assurances to all potentially
responsible persons.193  Taking such action to avoid getting
oneself ensnared into a § 6672 situation, if done correctly, also
goes a long way towards preventing a trust fund failure from
occurring at all, to the benefit of all potentially responsible
persons and indeed, to the public treasury itself.194
CONCLUSION
Because a large bulk of tax collections by the Treasury is
through employer withholding,195 trust fund liability is a
necessary tool to ensure the collection of revenue for the public
treasury. I.R.C. § 6672 was enacted "to assure payment of
withheld taxes,"196 and "was designed to cut through the shield of
organizational form and impose liability upon those actually
responsible for an employer's failure to withhold and pay over
the tax."197 But taxation, as Ricardo observed, "frequently
operates very differently from the intention of the legislature by its
by I.R.C. § 7502 and the regulations thereunder is valid evidence of a timely
filing of a tax return or payment. See Kenneth H. Ryesky, Analysis of The Split
Authority on Proof of a Postmark Under Internal Revenue Code § 7502, 21 U.
DAYTON L. REV. 379 (1996); Nicole D. Stanger, Carroll v. Commissioner: Narrow
Judicial Interpretations of Internal Revenue Code § 7502 May Cause Increased Burden
on Taxpayers, 30 AKRON L. REV. 581 (1997). Adhering to the explicit language of
the Internal Revenue Code in that regard is certainly good advice. See I.R.C.
§ 7502 (2003).
193. See Mason Motors Co. v. United States, 8 F. Supp. 2d 1177, 1178 (D.
Minn. 1998) (noting how when the employer no longer required the employee
to submit documentation and financial statements, the employee ceased paying
employment taxes); cf Reyers v. N.Y. State Tax Comm'n, 498 N.Y.S.2d 199, 201
(N.Y. App. Div. 1986) (holding that where the petitioner obtained false verbal
assurances that tax returns were filed and paid the willfulness requirement of
the state statute was not met and thus the tax assessment was annulled).
194. I.R.C. § 6672 (2003).
195. See U.S. Treasury Dep't, Table 18-Treasury Department Gross Tax
Collections: Amount Collected by Quarter and Fiscal Year, FY 1987-2002,
available at http://www.irs.gov/pub/irs-soi/02tcl8fy.xls (last visited Aug. 27,
2003).
196. Slodov v. United States, 436 U.S. 238, 248 (1978).
197. Pacific Nat'l Ins. Co. v. United States, 422 F.2d 26, 31 (9th Cir. 1970).
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indirect effects." 198 The harsh results of the IRS asserting the trust
fund penalties are obviously not the primary legislative intent
behind I.R.C. § 6672.199
Though the Federal right of contribution under I.R.C.
§ 6672(d) was certainly a step in the appropriate direction, there is
much more that can be done by the governing authorities to
apply the trust fund scheme in a fair and equitable manner; or,
better still, to reduce the number of instances in which it is
necessary to resort to it at all.200 For one thing, there is little to
protect the lowly subordinate from the personal financial effects
of the unemployment which may result from disobedience of
directives from above that are contrary to the trust fund
obligation.201 Though many would call for new statutory
remedies to the problem, there is much to suggest that more
credible and consistent enforcement of the existing remedies,
criminal or otherwise, would go a long way towards curbing the
trust fund abuses by employers. 2 2 Moreover, the IRS can do its
part to educate and inform the responsible persons of their
responsibilities.203  But regardless of what the governmental
authorities do, the ultimate responsibility rests upon the
responsible persons.204
198. DAVID RICARDO, THE PRINCIPLES OF POLITICAL ECONOMY AND TAXATION
157 (. M. Dent & Sons 1973) (1817), reprinted in 1 THE WORKS AND
CORRESPONDENCE OF DAVID RICARDO 239 (Piero Sraffa, ed., Cambridge Univ.
Press, 1951), also available at
http://www.econib.org/library/Ricardo/ricP4.html#Ch.16, Taxes on Wages
(last visited Aug. 13, 2003).
199. Slodov, 436 U.S. at 247-248.
200. I.R.C. § 6672(d) (2003).
201. See generally supra notes 115-116 and accompanying text.
202. See, e.g., Leonard R. Rosenblatt, Payroll Tax Fraud: No Excuses, No
Exemptions, N.J. L.J., Feb. 15, 1999, at 36.
203. See, e.g., IRS's Efforts to Improve Compliance With Employment Tax
Requirements Should Be Evaluated: Report to the U.S. Sen. Comm. on Small
Bus. & Entrepreneurship, 2002 Leg., 107th Sess. (Jan. 15, 2002).
TBOR2 included, inter alia, an uncodified provision requiring the IRS to
"take such actions as may be appropriate to ensure that employees are aware of
their responsibilities under the Federal tax depository system." TBOR2,
§ 904(b), 110 Stat. 1467 July 30, 1996.
204. I.R.C. § 6672 (2003).
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Sufficient case law guidance on the construction of I.R.C.
§ 6672(d) has not yet developed, and many ambiguities remain.205
As with other new statutes, the courts will eventually deal with
clarifying its specific applications. Though the attorneys
representing responsible persons will no doubt play a proactive
role in bringing about the interpretation of the law, and will,
hopefully, achieve remunerative gain for their labors in doing so,
persons responsible for facilitating the tax withholding process
would do well to heed Professor Siegel's oft tendered
admonishment that such legal advancements are best suited for
"Somebody Else's Case."206
205. See generally discussion, supra Part II.
206. See, e.g., David D. Siegel, Expiration of Lis Pendens Forfeits Right to
Foreclose Mortgage, N.Y. L.J., Nov. 8, 2002, at 4 ("It will make them pursue the lis
pendens requirements punctiliously, leaving the ultimate resolution of the
matter to be determined in the best place possible -Somebody Else's Case.");
David D. Siegel, The Recent Amendments to Rule 4 Pose Problems for Practitioners,
NAT'L L.J., Aug. 1, 1983, at 48 ("The cited F.R.D. article.., had nothing specific
to proffer-except the admonition to let the matter get decided in somebody
else's case, which means toeing the line on all of the new requirements
punctiliously."); see also Miller v. Weyerhaeuser Co., 685 N.Y.S.2d 393, 395 (N.Y.
Sup. Ct. 1999) ("This case presents a classic example that Professor David D.
Siegel characteristically warns practitioners about when he says let it happen in
'Somebody Else's Case."'); Norman H. Dachs & Jonathan A. Dachs, The New
Venue Rule, N.Y. L.J., Jan. 9, 2001, at 3 ("Under the circumstances, the best and
easiest advice is the advice so often given by Professor Siegel, and given by him
in this situation as well, which is to let it be in 'somebody else's case' that these
issues be resolved.").
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